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Play a Role in 
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R epositories oftissues, cell lines, blood samples, and other biological specimens are crucial to genomics, proteomics, and other emerging 
forms ofbiomedical research.1 Creation of these repos-
itories by individual researchers and their affiliated or-
ganizations,2 commercial entities, and even govern-
ments3 has been labeled ''biobanking" in the bioethics 
literature. Biobanking as a metaphor for the collection, 
transfer, and use of these specimens suggests a frame-
work for the legal response to conflicts that may arise -
one embedded in principles of contract law and prop-
erty ownership with an overlay of legislatively autho-
rized regulation of the "industry." 
The decision by the federal district court in Greenberg 
v. Miami Children's Hospital Research Institut& illus-
trates how the current framework operates in practice. 
This case involved a dispute over the control of the gene 
and genetic test for Canavan disease, a rare neurologi-
cal disorder. Plaintiffs furnished blood, tissue, and other 
specimens to the researcher who discovered and 
patented the gene and genetic test. Their "deposits" in 
the researcher's biobank provided the foundation for 
their claim that they should be allowed to participate in 
decisions about how the test was marketed and dis-
tributed. The court explored a number oflegal theories 
for resolving the dispute over control of the patent. The 
court dismissed all of the plaintiffs' claims for control 
over the actions of the researcher and his associated 
hospitals and research institutes based on tort theories 
-lack of informed consent, conversion, fraudulent con-
cealment -but allowed that the plaintiffs might be able 
to recover under an unjust enrichment theory.5 This 
theory, more like a contract without consideration in 
terms of its possible remedy, allows courts to balance 
the interests of researchers and subjects6 and implies 
that prospective contracts between subjects and re-
searchers are the preferred mode for sharing the bene-
fits and the risks ofbiobanking.7 
I propose an alternative way of constructing a frame-
work for a legal response to the collection and transfer 
of specimens. Rather than thinking ofblood, DNA, cell 
lines, etc., solely in terms of their materiality - assets 
subject to control - I propose that these specimens 
(whether derived from humans, animals, or plants) 
renewed as data with the potential to become useful 
knowledge. 
The ethical challenge involved in this line of analysis 
is to articulate the role oflaw in the groWth, distribu-
tion, and use of professional knowledge in society. The 
legal framework should be built on distinctions among 
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the various types of"entitlements" that law uses tore-
solve disputes about transfers gone awry from some-
one's perspective. I am using the term "entitlement" as 
used in the classic article by Calabresi and Melamed to 
describe the various legal rules or doctrines used to op-
timize the risks and benefits of the transfer of various 
kinds of assets. They distinguish liability rules, rules of 
inalienability, and property rules.8 
An interest is protected by a property rule when in-
dividuals can sell or otherwise transfer their interests to 
others, and legal disputes would be determined by ref-
erence to contract rules or property rules. Remedies for 
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Liability rules protect an entitlement by using after-
the-fact determinations of judges and juries to deter-
mine the value of the disputed transaction. Thus, the 
remedies are objective in the sense that the parties to 
the transaction, such as a physician and a patient, gen-
erally are not allowed to agree in advance on the dam-
ages or specific remedy for a medical misadventure. 
Rather, the law views the patient/physician exchange as 
governed by a duty of care to the patient that cannot be 
waived. More important, the determination of the 
amount of damages is made by reference to criteria ex-
ternal to the parties at the time they entered the trans-
Social and technological change, particularly in science and medicine, poses 
a challenge to a strict prohibition of any transfers involving the human body as 
illustrated by organ and tissue transfers from living and dead human beings. 
a proven breach of the agreement are aimed at restor-
ing the parties to their pre-exchange position through 
damages, and sometimes through an injunction. Fur-
thermore, these types of remedies are generally de-
signed to protect a market in the particular kind of as-
sets. It is thus not surprising that some aspects of the 
transfer of specimens, particularly among researchers, 
universities, and companies, are in fact governed by 
written contracts that the parties believe to be legally 
enforceable.9 
In contrast, when the legal system prohibits the sell-
ing of a particular asset, Calabresi and Melamed would 
say that the entitlement is governed by a rule against its 
sale, thus a rule of inalienability. As pointed out in their 
article, the United States Constitution's prohibition 
against selling humans into slavery, even if alleged to be 
"voluntary," is an example of society's interest in the in-
tegrity of the human body being protected by a rule of 
inalienability.10 Social and technological change, par-
ticularly in science and medicine, poses a challenge to 
a strict prohibition of any transfers involving the human 
body, as illustrated by organ and tissue transfers from 
living and dead human beings.n Through positive leg-
islative enactment, law in the United States allows the 
"gift" of a human body part, but not its sale in a com-
mercial transaction 12 - leading to the notion that the 
prohibited transfer is a prohibition of market inalien-
ability.13 Similarly, by statutory enactment, the transfer 
of blood is a "service" that can only be provided by ali-
censed professional.14 When a contract is void as against 
public policy, for instance when a legislature prohibits 
surrogate parenting contracts, the better rationale for 
the decision is that the transfer of parenting entitle-
ments (or more accurately in lay terms "obligations") is 
to be done through adoption rather than the market.15 
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action, such as the amount of lost wages, additional 
medical expenses, and pain and suffering incurred by 
the plaintiff. The fact that the duty or liability rules 
dominate our thinking about the physician/patient re-
lationship does not preclude a physician from recover-
ing for the value of his or her services because law rec-
ognizes that the physician's entitlement to professional 
services is protected by a property entitlement. But we 
should remember that once the physician/patient rela-
tionship has been established, the physician risks a suit 
for abandonment if he or she discharges a patient for 
lack of payment without ensuring that the plaintiff has 
an alternative.16 
Although disease management has generally been 
dominated by liability rules, 17 it is not yet clear in the era 
of genomics whether and how liability rules should 
operate with regard to biobanking. There are in fact few 
if any fully litigated tort-based cases dealing directly 
with the transfer of specimens, tissues, DNA, etc., in 
either the research or clinical context. Most of these 
cases are not about the remedies or the amount of dam-
ages, but rather about the first line of inquiry: has the 
plaintiff stated a cause of action? Under my proposed 
analysis, the question is really whether the plaintiff's 
interest in the data is protected by a liability rule. Rules 
of liability - properly understood as distinct from 
property rules - raise this question: under what cir-
cumstances should courts or legislatures authorize 
individuals (and groups) to exercise control over pro-
fessionals and their organizations?18 
Despite the jurisprudential support for a contractual 
approach to issues involving research, 19 a systemic view 
of the function of liability rules in research and health 
care delivery could be used to justifY liability rules as a 
basis oflimited social control over the research/clinical 
7I 
SYMPOSIUM 
enterprise by forcing the research enterprise to account 
for its practices before a court. Under this view, there-
sults sometimes favor plaintiffs, but at other times favor 
researchers, depending upon how institutional deci-
sion makers want to strike the balance. When litigants 
or scholars use ownership in tissue, 
provide an appropriate backdrop for ethical resolution 
in the legal context where the supposed contractual 
parties may have different concepts of property and the 
nature of the human body. This analysis is not meant to 
suggest that the Havasupai or other groups around the 
blood, or DNA as the basis of a tort 
action, they are asserting that the 
entitlement to their tissue should be 
characterized by reference to prop-
erty rules. Conversion protects a 
property entitlement through a tort 
action, but is not an example of gen-
eralliability theory represented pri-
marily by actions in negligence. My 
thesis is that the use of tort theories, 
A patient such as John Moore, who was successfully 
treated for a serious form of leukemia, would have 
a hard time convincing a jury that he would not have 
undergone the treatment had he been aware of the 
research interests or the financial interests of his 
treating physician. 
or more generally liability rules, in the biobanking con-
text is an attempt to optimize the benefits and risks of 
knowledge distribution. 
The center piece of this analysis is a rejection of the 
attempts to use conversion theory as a basis ofliability 
in disputes over blood, tissue, DNA, etc. Under my 
analysis, Moore v. Regents of California20 rightly re-
jected the conversion theory. On the other hand, 
Moore's use of the theory oflack of informed consent as 
a possible basis for liability is foundational to under-
standing the role ofliability in the biobanking context. 
A lack of informed consent action in the clinical context 
is nearly impossible for a plaintiff to win because plain-
tiffs have the nearly impossible task of convincing a 
jury they would not have undergone a procedure - often 
life-saving as in Moore - had they been informed of 
some financial or research interest of the clinician. 
Nonetheless, ruling on motions to dismiss a lack of in-
formed consent count as in Moore requires a court to ar-
ticulate the underlying purpose of the informed consent 
doctrine. The purpose in a liability action, as opposed 
to the purpose of regulations on informed consent, is to 
provide incentives for physician/researchers to disclose 
information to patients/subjects/consumers21 - not to 
promote patient/subject autonomy.22 
Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Institute, 23 where blood 
samples from children were collected as part of a lead 
abatement study, illustrates the role of liability in a pure 
research context or knowledge di~covery process, in-
dependent of apparent commercial interests implicit in 
the biobank metaphor. Grimes illustrates that other 
courts, wheri faced with vulnerable populations, such as 
children, depart from the contractual model underlying 
the bank metaphor. 
Finally, a pending case involving the use and distri-
bution of blood and handprints from members of the 
Havasupai tribe illustrates why the contractual or prop-
erty model clearly breaks down.24 Contract rules do not 
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globe should not use contract rules to negotiate with re-
searchers about the use of human tissue in research or 
how commercial profits should be distributed. Rather, 
this analysis seeks to highlight the unique role that lia-
bility rules can play in the exercise of social control over 
researchers, clinicians, and their affiliated organiza-
tions in the Human Genome Era25 as data distribution 
becomes global. 
A regulatory model that seeks to balance various in-
terests ignores the potential "progressive" role ofliabil-
ity in allowing individuals and groups to question the 
existing paradigms. 26 With the growing popularity of a 
property rights approach to conflicts about the use of 
human tissues among legal scholars27 and pressure to 
procure more organs and tissue, 28 this article is a plea 
for more attention to the role ofliability rules in arriv-
ing at the appropriate institutional balance between 
research goals and promises versus individual and 
group desires to have some degree of social control over 
the research enterprise. 
Part 1: Data to Knowledge 
Moore v. Regents ofCalifornia29 illustrates how part of 
the human body is in fact "data" that allegedly was 
transformed into professional knowledge. John Moore 
was Dr. Golde's patient at the University of California 
at Los Angeles Medical Center in 1976.30 Dr. Golde rec-
ommended the removal of Moore's spleen as part of the 
successful treatment ofhis hairy cell leukemia. It turned 
out upon examination of Moore's excised spleen, that 
his DNA was unique because it overproduced proteins 
that regulate the immune system. Over the course of the 
next seven years, Moore provided Dr. Golde with blood, 
skin tissue, bone marrow, and sperm. Dr. Golde devel-
oped a c~ll-line from tissue, blood, and other body flu-
ids that Moore provided, and filed a patent application 
on the cell-line, granted a license to a biotechnology 
company, and received other economic benefits from 
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the biotechnology company.31 After Moore discovered 
that the "Mo cell line" had been used to develop drugs 
for the treatment of several forms of cancer, he sued Dr. 
Golde, the University of California, the assignee of the 
patent, and the various biotechnology firms involved in 
the development and distribution of the drugs. 
Moore argued thirteen theories ofliability,32 includ-
ing that the defendants had misappropriated his "prop-
erty" by using his DNA to develop the cell-line and 
drugs. The court rejected this claim in conversion, 
which was based on the theory that the various defen-
dants had interfered with Moore's possessory interest in 
his spleen, tissue, blood, etc.33 When it rejected the 
claim based on Moore's alleged property interest in his 
unique DNA, the California Supreme Court accord-
ingly dismissed the claims against the assignee of the 
patents -the biotechnology companies. The court did, 
however, hold that a physician/scientist has a duty to 
disclose his research and financial interests in the pa-
tient's cells, tissue, and DNA.34 Presumably, this means 
that Dr. Golde should have told John Moore of his in-
terest in developing the cell-line and pursuing the 
patent, as well as ofhis financial arrangements with the 
companies developing the drugs. Although the case 
was settled after this ruling, the court's result uses the 
judicially developed doctrine of lack of informed con-
sent to balance the interests of patients and physi-
cian/scientists. 35 The result in Moore protects scientific 
innovation because the duty to disclose established by 
the court exempts the companies - those who might 
bring successful products to market- while protecting 
the patient's interest in autonomy by granting a theo-
retical right not to participate in the research. 
The holding in Moore that a patient who provided 
DNA used in the discovery of a patent for a new phar-
maceutical could not recover in conversion has become 
infamous in the legal literature. The underlying rea-
soning by the California Supreme Court that the patient 
had no "property interest" in his DNA precluded his re-
covery on that theory. This ruling has given birth to a 
host of critical articles36 although most courts facing the 
issue have generally followed the California Supreme 
Court's reasoning that the tort of conversion assumes a 
"property interest."37 
The court's alternative holding that a patient could re-
cover from the physician/scientist on the basis of lack 
of informed consent or breach of fiduciary duty has not 
received similar attention or, in my opinion, the praise 
it deserves. There are at least two reasons for the lack 
of critical acclaim for liability claims in the biomedical 
research and clinical settings. First, lack of informed 
consent cases are nearly impossible for plaintiffs to Win. 
A patient such as John Moore, who was successfully 
treated for a serious form of leukemia, would have a 
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hard time convincing a jury that he would not have 
undergone the treatment had he been aware of there-
search interests or the financial interests ofhis treating 
physician. The plaintiff appears to have a "right" to re-
covery on the basis of the physician's failure to disclose 
his research and financial interests. But the plaintiff 
has little prospect of interesting a good contingency-
based plaintiff's attorney to even take the case, since the 
actual damages provable under the theory are minimal 
as long as the liability theory is grounded in negligence 
as opposed to gross negligence. 
The second, and perhaps more serious objection, 
comes from bioethicists and others who consider the 
informed consent doctrine an essential means of pro-
moting individual autonomy. The individual autonomy 
proponents do not object to expansion of the informed 
consent doctrine by the Moore court. Rather, these 
scholars rely upon the famous statement by Justice Car-
dozo, "Every person has the right to decide what should 
be done with his body" to conceptualize a person's DNA 
as part of the patient's body that she or he should be able 
to control throughout the research and knowledge 
discovery process. A patient has little ability to exercise 
control under the Moore case once the DNA has been 
used to create new drugs unless the patient somehow 
shares in the future profits. 
The individual autonomy justification for the lack of 
informed consent in my view is mistaken if one analyzes 
what even a relatively liberal court like the California 
Supreme Court has done with its own doctrine. In a 
case decided after Moore, the court adopted what I have 
previously called a duty to disclose purpose for the lack 
of informed consent doctrine when it held an oncolo-
gist had no duty to disclose to a patient the statistical 
chances of surviving pancreatic cancer with experi-
mental treatment. 38 The duty to disclose rationale for 
the doctrine focuses on trying to articulate the specific 
rules for defining the scope of what physicians (and 
perhaps researchers) should have disclosed in the 
course of their encounters with patients in the modern 
health care system. In the pancreatic cancer case, the 
court limited the physician's duty to disclose because a 
physician's duty does not include estate planning or 
other matters beyond the physician's expertise. 39 
This more limited rationale for the lack of informed 
consent doctrine recognizes two aspects oflegal insti-
tutions sometimes ignored by scholars. When other 
courts began to examine the modern version oflack of 
informed consent grounded in negligence rather than 
battery, it is worth remembering that not all courts fol-
lowed California in declaring the standard of disclosure 
to be what a reasonable patient would want to know. 
Some courts thought that the standard for disclosure 
should be what a reasonable professional told patients. 
73 
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Although the literature has tended to concentrate on fa-
mous informed consent cases based on the reasonable 
patient theory, such as Cobbs v. Grant, 40 it is worth not-
ing that about half the states have adopted a profes-
sional standard for evaluating the duty to disclose. 
In addition, legislatures often imposed limits on the 
scope of the informed consent doctrine. New York, for 
instance, limited the scope of recovery under the doc-
trine to "intrusive invasions}' Thus, a New York court 
has ruled that a person who consented to the drawing 
of blood could not recover for lack of informed consent 
when the physician ordered additional tests that re-
vealed a condition that stigmatized the patientY This 
interpretation of the New York statute highlights the 
need to avoid the commoditization of the health care 
and human research systems either to protect physi-
cian/scientists or patient/subject interests. 
To create a more systemic view of the role ofliability 
as the assets in biobanks are transferred and distributed 
around the globe, I suggest we think of this biological 
material as data that might be transformed into knowl-
edge. John Moore's DNA in the Moore case is a bit of 
data gathered in a social context - the health care de-
livery system -where courts impose retrospectively de-
termined duties of disclosure as a prerequisite for using 
the data. Such retrospective rules, along with certain 
market forces, such as more highly educated patients 
with access to information, have changed institutional 
practice in medicine. Informed consent forms are a 
part of health care practice today, whereas the seeking 
of patients' consent was not a routine practice in health 
care settings a half-century ago. Informed consent also 
seems to be a touchstone of best practices in the col-
lection of tissue for repositories, but with perhaps a 
different legal influence. Federal regulations on re-
search impose an obligation of obtaining informed con-
sent, but leave open what role liability should play in en-
forcing those rules. 
The recent ruling in the Canavan disease case, Green-
berg v. Miami Children's Research Institute, 42 suggests 
that under Florida's law of informed consent, the duty 
to disclose financial interests is not a part of liability 
doctrine. The dispute in Greenberg arose after the 
"holder" of the patent for the Canavan disease gene and 
its accompanying genetic test had attempted to enforce 
it patents. The plaintiffs claimed that when they and 
their affiliated organizations had provided tissue, blood, 
and DNA samples from their children and themselves 
the researcher should have informed them of his intent 
to patent the genetic discovery. The district court dis-
missed the plaintiffs' claim on this count. 
On the other hand, the court's suggestion that the 
plaintiffs might recover on the basis that the researcher 
and his affiliated organizations unjustly enriched them-
74 
selves could be seen as a blow to a contractualist ap-
proach to biobanking. The theory of unjust enrichment 
is built on the assumption that no valid legal contract 
governs the exchange between the parties. On the other 
hand, modern theorists, such as the authors of the Re-
statement on Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, af-
firm that claims based on validly executed contracts 
are superior to the unjust enrichment claims and their 
remedies based in equitable notions of restitution.43 
A more concise framing of the issue in Greenberg is 
in terms of data acquisition and transformation. It is 
clear that the plaintiffs and their affiliated organizations 
provided crucial data that led to the discovery and 
patenting of the Canavan gene and test. Whether or not 
the defendants had a duty to disclose certain informa-
tion to the plaintiffs would depend upon how the court 
views the market for data transfer and transformation. 
As between the particular plaintiffs and defendants in 
Greenberg, the district court may have made a prag-
matic judgment that some form of diffuse liability 
would lead to a rough settlement and a future of con-
tracts.44 The important point is that Greenberg is not the 
definitive ruling on the role ofliability. Furthermore, the 
existence of liability as a retrospective method of de-
lineating the duties of disclosure does not preclude 
some individuals and groups who provide biological 
samples to researchers from using contracts as a 
method of social control.45 
The more systemic way of viewing the lack of in-
formed consent doctrine, however, is to see its devel-
opment in terms of various stages. What some schol-
ars have called the "second revolution in informed 
consent"46 essentially conceptualizes the doctrine in 
terms of when courts may impose the obligation to dis-
close information that is readily accessible to providers. 
In clinical settings this might mean information about 
how many operations or procedures a particular 
provider has done relative to other providers. I suggest 
in the research or data collection settings that these 
duties might include disclosure about provider inten-
tions to use the data or conveying information relevant 
to individual health risks to participants in research 
projects. 
Part II: Collecting Data from 
Vulnerable Subjects 
Grimes v. Kennedy Kreiger Institute, Inc. 47 also involves 
the collection of data, including blood samples. The 
plaintiffs in Grimes were low income, predominantly 
minority group members, who were recruited by the re-
search team and the collaborating government agencies 
to live in certain rental units. The data at issue in that 
case was not directly relevant to the underlying re-
search objective - determining whether less than full 
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lead abatement was cost-effective and relatively risk 
free from an environmental health perspective - but 
potentially highly relevant to the plaintiffs. The ele-
vated level oflead in the children's blood did not put the 
children at any immediate risk of physical damage, but 
the data could be used by parents to reduce the risk of 
future harm. 
The plaintiffs in Grimes claimed that the researchers 
breached their duty of disclosure by failing to promptly 
inform them of the elevated lead levels in their chil-
dren's blood. The Maryland Court of Appeals held that 
research organizations could not rely upon the consent 
of parents when they put children at risk, however 
minor, in a non-therapeutic setting. The potential flaw 
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that the researchers had a duty to ensure access to 
health care if needed, particularly since the defendants 
were affiliated with a major academic medical center.48 
Furthermore, the nature of the research, not just the 
intention to use the blood for future research and de-
velopment, may have triggered the court's imposition of 
greater duties in Grimes than Greenberg. In the latter, 
the objective of the research - discovery of a test for 
Canavan disease - was clear to all parties involved in the 
case and the court. The genetic nature of the research 
meant it was "high profile" even though the actual dis-
ease is relatively rare. By contrast, Grimes involved ''low 
visibility" research in that public health research has 
traditionally not enjoyed the same media and public 
visibility as genetics. Recent threats of 
To create a more systemic view of the role of 
liability as the assets in biobanks are transferred 
and distributed around the globe, I suggest we 
think of this biological material as data that 
might be transformed into knowledge. 
bioterrorism and the emergence of new 
types of infectious diseases such as Se-
vere Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) 
may increase the visibility of public 
health, but at present law's response to 
public health must deal with the historic 
tensions inherent in a public health ap-
proach: the interests of the community 
in the informed consent process used by the researchers 
should be understood in the larger social context of this 
particular research project, with some useful contrasts 
to Greenberg, starting with the plaintiffs. 
In contrast, the Greenberg plaintiffs were members of 
an ethnic group with an interest in using genetics to 
prevent harm to their particular community. It is clear 
that they were more educated than the Grimes plain-
tiffs, but more important, shared with researchers a 
certain faith in scientific progress. On the other hand, 
the children/plaintiffs in Grimes would certainly meet 
the federal research regulations' definition of a "vul-
nerable population:' The Grimes court may have viewed 
access to courts in the form of a liability action as espe-
cially important for groups who suffer from many social 
disabilities, including being among those who experi-
ence disparate health care outcomes and access to 
health care. 
I have suggested elsewhere that the Grimes court 
may have been concerned that the routine practice of 
promising a referral to a physician, in this case for eval-
uation when the blood level rose above a certain point, 
was ineffective for low income individuals. Those with-
out health insurance (or adequate health insurance) 
do not necessarily have access to health care generally, 
or coverage for the type of risk assessment and follow-
up required for lead poisoning. An acute paradigm for 
health care intervention - seeking health care advice 
when clearly "sick" or symptomatic from emergency 
rooms - may not include having a family doctor for 
oneself or one's children. The court may have implied 
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versus the interests of individuals. Public health ap-
proaches to housing carry with it the historical burden 
of failed public housing policies that have dispropor-
tionately impacted the poor and minorities in urban 
settings. 
Grimes is somewhat of a paradox. In one sense, it is 
a pure research case where a court finds a duty to dis-
close within the pure research context. The duty is ap-
parently founded in negligence, dependant upon the 
particular facts, and is somewhat independent of the 
"lack of informed consent doctrine" developed in clin-
ical settings. On the other hand, Grimes is an indication 
that the research must be placed in a larger social con-
text of whether the particular plaintiffs are in need of 
access to courts in order to maintain the appropriate 
institutional balance between science and medicine. 
Part III: Data Collection and 
Health Care Disparities 
The Havasupai Tribe in Arizona and some of its mem-
bers recently filed suit against the Arizona State Uni-
versity and some of its researchers regarding the use of 
blood samples originally collected in the early 199 Os re-
flecting the high incidence of diabetes among members 
of the tribe. 49 The plaintiffs have alleged that blood and 
other samples were used in studies of schizophrenia, 
and in ancestry and human migration, without their 
knowledge or consent. There are multiple counts in the 
complaints involving fraud, intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, conversion, violation of civil rights, 
lack of informed consent, and breach of fiduciary duties. 
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The lack ofinformed consent claim best illustrates why 
liability has a role in social control regardless of who the 
court ultimately determines should prevail on the issue. 
Liability highlights the limitations of contractual analy-
sis for disputes involving biobanks, especially when ap-
plied to a group such as a Native American tribe, or in-
digenous people anywhere. 
The major harm alleged by the tribe was the publi-
cation of scientific articles alleging that the tribe had its 
origins in Asia, in contrast to the religious and cultural 
beliefs of the Havasupai that their origin is "Red Butte" 
located in the Grand Canyon. 50 Despite the oversight of 
the Institutional Review Board of Arizona State Uni-
versity, the plaintiffs allege that non-diabetes research 
was not authorized and that the researchers had unau-
thorized access to medical records and unapproved ac-
cess to hand prints of some members of the tribe from 
1990 to 1994 when blood samples were collected. 
I will not attempt to analyze here the complex issues 
involved with the application offederal research regu-
lations on federally recognized reservations and other 
aspects of law governing relationships with Native 
Americans.51 I do, however, note that Native Ameri-
cans have had a disproportionately high rate of dia-
betes for a number of years and access to appropriate 
health care for the condition has been on the policy 
agenda long before the Healthy People 2010 goals were 
established. 52 Furthermore, in understanding the social 
context under which judges will decide these claims, 
one factor ought to be considered in urging courts to 
view this issue as a matter of data transmission and 
disclosure. 
Recent litigation over whether DNA testing could be 
used to determine the origins of human remains in 
Oregon illustrates that researchers and indigenous peo-
ples may have very different concepts of the human 
body. 53 Attempting to use common law rules of contract 
as an attempt to solve in advance the ethical dilemmas 
of the future are likely to fail if alleged parties to the con-
tract start with fundamentally different notions of the 
human body and its constituent parts. The possibility 
of prospecting for biological samples among indige-
nous peoples should make us cautious of the contrac-
tual approach to biobanking. We are aware that some 
religious groups within our society object to the prac-
tice of autopsy. 54 New rules are needed at all levels, such 
as university rules prohibiting the removal of samples 
collected when a researcher leaves the university. 5 5 
More generally, if courts only infrequently enter into 
this system of collecting and transferring of DNA, tis-
sue, or blood, a liability rule focusing on the transfer of 
data into knowledge will highlight rather than obscure 
the ethical issues and provide appropriate focus on the 
context. In the case of the Havisupai, it is clear that re-
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searchers were after "data" even though they may have 
believed their research would assist the tribe in dealing 
with its members' diabetes. From the investigation 
jointly authorized by Arizona State University and the 
Havisupai, it is clear that the standards for securing the 
informed consent of the subjects and the community as 
well as the supervision of the consent process were in-
adequate by today's standards - less than fifteen years 
from the date of the earliest collection. 56 
Furthermore, the uses and alleged misuses of the 
samples stored in numerous laboratories in university 
and commercial enterprises may not become sources of 
conflicts for years to come when results are published 
or patents are obtained. One of the functions ofliabil-
ity rules is to give access to courts where the harms and 
benefits of certain actions are not equally distributed. 
Or to put the matter in terms of comparative institu-
tional analysis, forcing an isolated tribe in Arizona to 
seek legislative or regulatory reform appears unfeasible 
or a defense of the status quo. Allowing a liability suit 
to move forward - or to get past the motion for sum-
mary judgment or dismissal - merely realigns the ne-
gotiating postures of the parties. 
Liability rules, as I stated before, do not preclude 
tribes from negotiating with researchers and their or-
ganizations about the scope of research and what their 
duties of disclosure might be. There are, however, lim-
itations on the scope of contracting embedded in fed-
eral research regulations. In the collection of samples, 
researchers should be aware that exculpatory clauses 
about negligence are prohibited.57 Researchers and 
their lawyers should be leery of assuming that all en-
compassing clauses will be upheld by courts once ali-
ability-based claim is filed. 
Second, the ethical standards for research, and thus 
for disclosure, are still evolving. Hindsight judgment of 
the ethics of research is the norm, rather than what re-
searchers thought or reasonably believed at the time. 
The public health researchers in the Tuskegee Study of 
Untreated Syphilis of Negro Men58 may have believed 
their study was justified at the time. Nonetheless, po-
litical leaqers and scholars generally condemned the 
lack of informed consent in the studies using a post-
Tuskegee theory of the role of informed consent in re-
search. 59 
Third, it is necessary and proper to give donors of 
biological samples the option to withdraw their samples 
in consent documents. It is also appropriate for re-
searchers to begin to consider what to do with samples 
once the particular study is halted, either because of 
lack of funds, the movement of key research personnel, 
or lack of interest on the part of researchers who re-
main. Even if an institution decides to prohibit re-
searchers from taking samples with them, how can such 
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a limitation be imposed in smaller laboratories as op-
posed to large scale sequencing facilities? 
Conclusion 
Biobanking is a powerful metaphor for conceptualizing 
the role of law in the distribution and control of data 
used in genomic research. Once tissue or blood is 
thought of as an "asset," courts and legal scholars are 
naturally attracted to contract and property rules as a 
means of balancing the interests of individuals and 
groups, on the one hand, and those of researchers and 
their affiliated professional organizations on the other. 
In addition, carefully drafted contracts to cover the use 
of biological samples give the illusion of orderliness 
and certainty that appears to reduce litigation risk. 
I have argued that contracts have their role in the con-
trol of samples, but that liability should be the primary 
source for the legal framework for three reasons. First, 
liability rather than contract raises an important ethi-
cal issue after there has been an alleged injury: what de-
gree of social control should individuals have over re-
searchers and their organizations? This is essentially a 
question of whether the courts as opposed to the mar-
ket, legislators, or administrative agencies are the least 
detrimental forum for optimizing the use of biological 
samples in the creation of professional knowledge.60 
This institutional question generates a host of empiri-
cal inquiries, rather than questions of social values or 
rights. 61 
Second, liability rules are after-the-fact tools that 
may influence the actions of other individuals and or-
ganizations as they try to negotiate and reduce the risk 
of liability in the future. Contracts may play a role in 
some instances, but the liability framework helps us to 
question critically circumstances surrounding the col-
lection or use ofbiological samples derived from human 
beings. Liability rules - crude as they may be - adjust 
to changing social mores and attitudes and are more 
similar to the evolving ethical rules regarding biobanks. 
Conflicts over biobanking cannot be reduced to a code 
or a set of rules because of the dynamics of the market 
driving the use of human samples in knowledge cre-
ation. 
Finally, liability rules are a means of demonstrating 
that the function of the lack of informed consent doc-
trine in health care delivery or research is to impose du-
ties of disclosure on professionals. Rather than see the 
purpose of informed consent in liability law as pro-
moting individual autonomy, the purpose is to provide 
incentives for disclosure by providers and researchers. 
Under my analysis, liability has an important role to 
play in the distribution of professional knowledge. Par-
ticularly where there is an alleged misuse of samples, 
the donor - or the seller, perhaps in the future - could 
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not have known of the misuse when in good faith he or 
she entered the arrangement for use of one's own blood, 
tissue, etc. The residual power of liability as a tool for 
social control is thus dramatically illustrated when the 
providers ofhuman biological material and recipients 
have different cultural and religious beliefs - perhaps 
more common in the Human Genome Era of bio-
prospecting than we might wish. We should not ignore 
the role ofliability as part of a system of accountability 
in the current rush to "reform" the medical liability sys-
tem62 or to adopt "systems views" of medical and re-
search misadventures. 63 
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